Value chain · CLM-1034
In plain terms
The programme's transportation workshop said the schedule was probably unrealistic, and the programme's cost reviewer said the launcher fleet was too small for it: about one launch a day on a five-and-a-half-day turnaround with no reserve vehicles, and a fleet of slow electric ferries with no slack for accidents.
The claim as recorded
The programme's own transportation workshop found the timelines from the two-satellites-a-year schedule that drives every transportation figure probably unrealistic, and the programme's cost reviewer found the initial launcher fleet too small once delays and accidents are allowed for: the Workshop states "the assumed SPS construction rate of two satellites per year is an overriding system driver and the resulting nominal timelines are probably unrealistic", that HLLVs "must be turned around in 4 to 5 days" with airline-type operations, that "the timing of the present SPS program is clearly unrealistic with respect to space transportation" and that transportation development was funded "by a factor of between 2 and 5 below that deemed productive"; Battelle finds the initial fleet of six HLLVs "too small" at 1.2 launches a day and 5 1/2-day turnaround, and the 23-EOTV cycle of 180 days up, 40 down and 60 for handling "tight but probably adequate, except for the possibility of accidents".
Evidence behind this: T3, the programme's transportation workshop and its cost reviewer, judgements by analogy.
Scope and limits
Judgements, not analyses: the Workshop report says of itself that its tasks could not be "fully dispatched" in two and a half days; Battelle's fleet reasoning is by airline analogy (reserve of one in ten to fifteen). Neither derives an alternative rate. Battelle's figures are not reconciled on the page: six vehicles on a 5 1/2-day turnaround give at most 6 / 5.5 = 1.09 launches a day, below the stated 1.2 average, and the page calls the fleet "initially 6" without saying how the average is met; its stated concern is that too few physical vehicles may be available for several launches in one day because of the turnaround.
What it assumes
No assumptions are recorded against this claim.
Where it comes from
PDF p.188 / III-2: "In summary, the assumed SPS construction rate of two satellites per year is an overriding system driver and the resulting nominal timelines are probably unrealistic." PDF p.238 / IV-9: "HLLV must be turned around in 4 to 5 days. Short launch pad operations are necessary. Airline-type operations using on-board failure prediction and autonomous operational sequencing will be required." PDF p.248 / V-1, render read: "the timing of the present SPS program is clearly unrealistic with respect to space transportation". PDF p.241 / IV-12: "These assumptions are responsible for curtailing the level of funding effort by a factor of between 2 and 5 below that deemed productive for some areas." SRC-532 PDF p.22 / 1-16, render read: "The HLLV fleet size, initially 6, is considered to be too small when factors such as potential delays and the possibility of an accident are considered. The average launch rate is 1.2 per day and the stated turnaround time is 5 1/2 days." PDF p.24 / 1-18, render read: "The 23 EOTV's will make 31 flights per year with approximately 60 days allowed for loading, unloading and refurbishment. This appears tight but probably adequate, except for the possibility of accidents requiring unscheduled repairs."
Basis: launches per day; days; vehicles; USD
Related records
- Answers question
- QST-003 not published in this releaseQST-015 not published in this release
Cite this
energyaperture.com/c/clm-1034
CLM-1034, Energy Aperture, as of 1980.
Connected records
Other published records linked to this one. A list, not a judgement.
- Also from SRC-532
- CLM-1024The 1979 government estimate put a heavy-lift flight at about ten million dollars of the day, most of it people refurbishing the vehicle...CLM-1026The electric ferry takes half a year to climb to geostationary orbit but burns about an eighth of a kilogram of argon for every kilogram it...CLM-1027Getting a crew from low orbit up to the construction site took half a day and a stage the size of a small airliner, refuelled at the top...CLM-1028Building the rockets was priced at seventeen billion 1977 dollars and running them at about 2.8 billion per satellite, or roughly sixty...CLM-1029In 1980 the programme's own accounting had rockets at roughly one dollar in four of a satellite's cost and nearly one in two of the money...CLM-1030The independent 1980 cost review said the government's rocket numbers were fair for the stage the programme was at, then added spare...CLM-1031A launcher a third the size of the reference one would cost about a fifth more per kilogram to fly and need four launches a day instead of...CLM-1033At the higher of NASA's two peak figures, the launches would have needed about 6 per cent of US daily hydrogen output and 30 per cent of...
- Also from SRC-555
- CLM-1023The programme's last word on its rockets describes a launcher of about 11,000 tonnes at liftoff flying about once a day, gives fleet sizes...CLM-1025In 1980 the people building the case set themselves a goal of thirty dollars a kilogram to low orbit, hoped for fifteen later, and said in...CLM-1026The electric ferry takes half a year to climb to geostationary orbit but burns about an eighth of a kilogram of argon for every kilogram it...CLM-1027Getting a crew from low orbit up to the construction site took half a day and a stage the size of a small airliner, refuelled at the top...CLM-1029In 1980 the programme's own accounting had rockets at roughly one dollar in four of a satellite's cost and nearly one in two of the money...CLM-1031A launcher a third the size of the reference one would cost about a fifth more per kilogram to fly and need four launches a day instead of...CLM-1033At the higher of NASA's two peak figures, the launches would have needed about 6 per cent of US daily hydrogen output and 30 per cent of...