Value chain · CLM-1030
In plain terms
The independent 1980 cost review said the government's rocket numbers were fair for the stage the programme was at, then added spare vehicles because the plan assumed nothing would ever fail, roughly doubled the risk on the electric ferry because its unit price assumed a factory that did not exist, struck out the dedicated crew launcher, and put the running cost about eleven per cent higher with a much wider error band.
The claim as recorded
Battelle's November 1980 review of the JSC transportation costs finds them "reasonable early program estimates if some adjustments for optimistic development and operations scenarios are made" and makes the adjustments: the scenario assumes 100 per cent vehicle reliability with no engine-out or loss provision (30 engines at 0.99 each give 0.74 propulsion reliability), so one reserve HLLV ($595M), five reserve EOTVs and three POTVs are added; the EOTV's $283.6M average unit rests on a "mature industry" costing "open to challenge" - strict 85 per cent learning from the $2,126M first unit gives $29,457M for 23 vehicles, 70 per cent learning $16,880M, against the data book's $8,649M, and Battelle recommends $10,000M with uncertainty -15 to +100 per cent; the PLV booster development ($2,616M) is not justified when an HLLV personnel module would cost $100M to develop; and the totals move from DDT&E $17,077M with a potential "$20 billion to $26 billion", initial investment $17,149M to $20,776M (-15 to +70 per cent) and per-satellite $2,802M to $3,113M (-15 to +35 per cent), with ground support of $513M a year (6,425 man-years at $40 an hour) added because the transportation WBS excluded it.
Evidence behind this: T3-independent cost review (Battelle for DOE), which calls its own uncertainty method simplistic.
Scope and limits
Battelle's own words: "Our approach for assessing cost uncertainty is acknowledged to be somewhat simplistic" (PDF 15 / 1-9); the CER access it asked Boeing for was refused; the EOTV uncertainty "can only be rated as very high" and the -15/+100 is assigned, not computed. Its baseline agreement rests on "the constraint that the developments do not stretch technology availability" (PDF 67 / 2-33). The 1-13 passage calls $2.8 billion "HLLV costs" where the data book has it as total transport.
What it assumes
No assumptions are recorded against this claim.
Where it comes from
PDF p.16 / 1-10: "believed to be reasonable early program estimates if some adjustments for optimistic development and operations scenarios are made. The uncertainty in these estimates is high and not easily quantifiable". PDF p.78 / 3-5: engine reliability 0.99 / 0.999 / 0.9999 gives propulsion system reliability "0.74 0.97 0.997". PDF p.27 / 1-21, render read: "If 70 percent learning is experienced ... The initial production of 23 EOTVs would then have an initial investment requirement of $16.880 billion ... rather than the $8.649 billion"; PDF p.51 / 2-17: "This costing approach is open to challenge." Table 1.3.2 (PDF 32-33), render read: HLLV Initial Invest. 6,893 (6 Vehicles) -> 9,303 (7 Vehicles); EOTV Initial Invest. 8,649 (23) -> 10,000 (28), uncertainty -15%; +100%; PLV DDT&E 2,616 -> 100; SPS Transport DDT&E 17,077 -15%; +25%; Initial Invest. 17,149 -> 20,776 -15%; +70%; Per SPS 2,802 -> 3,113 -15%; +35%; Ground Support Per Year 513. PDF p.19 / 1-13: "a potential increase of the current estimate of $17 billion for DDT&E to $20 billion to $26 billion."
Basis: USD 1977 millions; per cent; probabilities
Related records
- Answers question
- QST-003 not published in this release
Cite this
energyaperture.com/c/clm-1030
CLM-1030, Energy Aperture, as of 1980-11.
Connected records
Other published records linked to this one. A list, not a judgement.
- Also from SRC-532
- CLM-1024The 1979 government estimate put a heavy-lift flight at about ten million dollars of the day, most of it people refurbishing the vehicle...CLM-1026The electric ferry takes half a year to climb to geostationary orbit but burns about an eighth of a kilogram of argon for every kilogram it...CLM-1027Getting a crew from low orbit up to the construction site took half a day and a stage the size of a small airliner, refuelled at the top...CLM-1028Building the rockets was priced at seventeen billion 1977 dollars and running them at about 2.8 billion per satellite, or roughly sixty...CLM-1029In 1980 the programme's own accounting had rockets at roughly one dollar in four of a satellite's cost and nearly one in two of the money...CLM-1031A launcher a third the size of the reference one would cost about a fifth more per kilogram to fly and need four launches a day instead of...CLM-1033At the higher of NASA's two peak figures, the launches would have needed about 6 per cent of US daily hydrogen output and 30 per cent of...CLM-1034The programme's transportation workshop said the schedule was probably unrealistic, and the programme's cost reviewer said the launcher...