Value chain · CLM-0744
In plain terms
The higher a satellite orbits, the longer the warning it gets: minutes in low orbit, but several hours at geostationary altitude, and the 2026 assessment doubts a missile could still track a target that had moved during those hours.
The claim as recorded
The same assessment states that orbital altitude buys defensive warning time: a LEO target has an estimated 5 to 15 minutes of warning after a direct-ascent launch, a MEO target at 20,000 km would have at least an hour, and a GEO target at 36,000 km would have several hours, with the assessment adding that the ability of a direct-ascent kill vehicle to adjust for changes in the target's trajectory over that time is unknown and unlikely at present; separately, for a co-orbital rendezvous approach it states the warning time of a deliberate close approach would likely be at least hours for LEO or days for GEO unless the attacking satellite was already in a very similar orbit.
Scope and limits
These are the assessment's own estimates and no derivation is given for any of the three figures. Warning time is not the same as an ability to act on the warning, and neither this source nor any other held gives a defensive or evasive manoeuvre capability for a large GEO structure; a satellite with very low thrust-to-mass may be unable to use hours of warning. The kill-vehicle judgement is explicitly conditioned on "at present". It says nothing about warning of an electronic or cyber attack, for which the warning time may be zero.
What it assumes
That warning depends on detection of the launch or of the deliberate manoeuvre, which the source's own reasoning assumes and which requires the space situational awareness the same document discusses elsewhere.
Where it comes from
PDF p.184, verbatim: "However, their even higher altitude (36,000 km) would mean an even longer warning time of several hours after launch. The ability of the DA-ASAT kill vehicle to adjust for any changes in the target's trajectory over that time is unknown, and unlikely at present." Same page, verbatim: "once launched, the target would only have an estimated 5-15 minutes of warning time before impact" (LEO) and "their higher altitude (20,000 km) would provide at least an hour of warning time after launch" (MEO). SRC-223 PDF p.178, verbatim: "The warning time of such a close approach would likely be at least hours (for LEO) or days (for GEO) unless the attacking satellite was already in a very similar orbit."
Basis: warning time in minutes, hours and days by orbit regime
Related records
- Answers question
- QST-011 not published in this release
Cite this
energyaperture.com/c/clm-0744
CLM-0744, Energy Aperture, as of 2026-04.
Connected records
Other published records linked to this one. A list, not a judgement.
- Also from SRC-223
- CLM-0741A 2026 independent assessment says China is unlikely to have a working weapon that could shoot down a satellite as high as geostationary...CLM-0742A 2026 assessment lists thirteen Chinese anti-satellite tests since 2005; only one is recorded as going far above low orbit, to about...CLM-0743Two separate expert bodies looked at the same 2013 Chinese launch and disagreed about what it was: one calls it probably a rocket test, the...CLM-0745The 2026 assessment says that if China physically destroyed a satellite, it would create long-lasting debris that would also endanger its...CLM-0765Searching all fourteen security and defence sources for anything about insurance or liability turns up no premium, no cover limit and no...
- Cited in articles