Value chain · CLM-1446
In plain terms
The 1977-80 US government programme did not decide for or against power satellites. It said questions on technology, environment and cost were still open, that a satellite would cost more to build, and less predictably, than conventional power stations, but that the range of its electricity costs was similar to that of other new options of the time, fusion and solar cells. A separate 1981 review for the US Congress said too little was known to decide, that the basic technologies had been shown to be feasible except lasers, and that, except perhaps for fusion, the up-front cost would be much higher than for other large power stations.
The claim as recorded
The 1977-80 DOE/NASA programme's statement of findings neither recommends building the satellite nor rejects it as too costly. Its November 1980 statement of findings says it fulfils the objective "to develop, by the end of 1980, an initial understanding of the technical feasibility, the economic practicality, and the social and environmental acceptability of the SPS concept", and that "Although significant technological, environmental and economic questions remain to be answered, the preliminary investigations undertaken in the CDEP do provide a basis for a policy decision on further commitment." DOE's 1977 policy statement, quoted in the report, had said the effort was "unlikely to achieve a firm recommendation to implement the SPS concept". On cost the report says "Estimates of R&D and industrial infrastructure costs are as much as $100 billion", that "The capital costs of a commercial SPS system would be higher and more uncertain than those of conventional electrical power systems (including the liquid metal fast breeder reactor)", and that "the range of SPS generating costs are similar to those of the other renewable technologies vying for commercialization in the post-2000 period (controlled fusion, photovoltaics)". Its comparative assessment found no insurmountable barrier to the satellite being part of a future energy plan. The separate 1981 assessment by the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) found that "Too little is currently known about the technical, economic, and environmental aspects of SPS to make a sound decision whether to proceed with its development and deployment", that "Except for a laser system, the basic SPS technologies have been proven technically feasible", that "Current overall cost estimates for the SPS and its major components are highly uncertain", and that "With the possible exception of fusion, the up-front costs for SPS would be significantly higher than competing baseload electric generating systems." It added that "The SPS RD&D cost is so high that commitment to it could foreclose fusion or the breeder."
Evidence behind this: T3: the programme's own statement of findings, issued by DOE, and a separate assessment by the Office of Technology Assessment for Congress; each is quoted for what it states.
Scope and limits
Neither document says the satellite was too costly, and neither rejects it: both describe large and uncertain costs and leave the decision to a later policy choice. The programme's generating-cost comparison is with other technologies not yet in use (fusion, photovoltaics), not with coal or nuclear plants; the numbers are in CLM-1447. OTA's "proven technically feasible" covers the basic technologies, not a working system, and its own summary table rates the system's engineering status "Unproven" (CLM-1447). The programme's cost figures are in CLM-1029 and CLM-1061. OTA draws on the programme's work (its Figure 28 is the programme's Figure 3.5), so the two are not fully independent. The programme was planned to end in 1980 (CLM-0076); these findings do not say what happened next. Both are 1980-81 views of the 1978 reference design.
What it assumes
No assumptions are recorded against this claim.
Where it comes from
PDF p.10 / printed vi, Preface, zoom 3 crop: the objective and the "basis for a policy decision" sentence as quoted. PDF p.11 / printed vii, "Economic Practicality", zoom 3 crop: "Because of the conceptual status of the SPS technology, there is uncertainty with respect to both costs of research and development and costs of commercial deployment."; the three cost sentences as quoted; "a decision on further commitment to the SPS concept must deal with the magnitude of this front-end expenditure for an alternative electric power producer". PDF p.13 / printed 1, section 1.4, zoom 3 crop: "As stated by DOE in the policy statement of October, 1977" ... "It must be realized that this effort is unlikely to achieve a firm recommendation to implement the SPS concept. Rather, if no insurmountable barriers are found, one would expect recommendations concerning the direction of the SPS program after fiscal year 1980 toward further laboratory experimentation and field testing." PDF p.52 / printed 40, section 3.4.7 "Summary Findings" of the comparative assessment, zoom 3 crop: the comparative assessment indicated no insurmountable barriers that would preclude the SPS from being part of a future energy alternatives plan, and that the life-cycle and capital costs for the SPS, central photovoltaics and fusion are in the same range and are dominated by uncertainties from the early state of the technology and the sensitivity to capacity factor (paraphrased, because the scan is degraded). SRC-601 PDF p.10 / printed 3, "Current Status", zoom 3 crop; PDF p.13 / printed 6, zoom 3 crop; PDF p.15 / printed 8, zoom 3 crop: the sentences as quoted, and "The assessments of up-front costs range from $40 billion to $100 billion" and NASA's "22-year investment of $102.4 billion (1977 dollars)" to the first 5 GW satellite. PDF p.129 / printed 125, zoom 2 render: "The SPS RD&D cost is so high that commitment to it could foreclose fusion or the breeder."
Basis: US dollars; no price year is printed beside the $100 billion (DOE) or the $40 billion to $100 billion (OTA); OTA's NASA figure is in 1977 dollars
Cite this
energyaperture.com/c/clm-1446
CLM-1446, Energy Aperture, as of 1981-08.
Connected records
Other published records linked to this one. A list, not a judgement.
- Also from SRC-409
- CLM-0076The 1980 programme report says the three-year programme was due to end in 1980, that the heating experiments still needed data to confirm...CLM-1410US government studies around 1980 thought crops might be grown under a receiving station, because its mesh lets most sunlight through and...
- Also from SRC-601
- CLM-1283In 1981 the US Congress's technology office worked out that keeping the edge of a receiving site to the Soviet limit would make each site...CLM-1284In 1981 the US Congress's technology office said there was not enough evidence to judge the health risk of living near a power-satellite...CLM-1285In 1981 the Soviet limit for workers was a thousand times stricter than the US one, and the US had no public limit at all. Congress's...CLM-1286The 1981 congressional assessment listed who would be exposed to the beam and how strongly. Levels ran from a ten-thousandth of a milliwatt...