Value chain · CLM-1166
In plain terms
An early tally of ordinary industrial harm from building the system: about twenty-five million lost working days from injuries over thirty years, more than half of them in mining the materials, and a materials bill that would take a large slice of a year's national output of mercury, argon, hydrogen and oxygen.
The claim as recorded
The 1978 preliminary assessment's conventional-impact figures, all for "an earlier SPS design": occupational injury and illness over the 30-year life of a satellite power system of 25.15 million person-days lost to injury and 0.82 million to illness, split material acquisition 14.63 and 0.45, ground construction 9.04 and 0.29, ground operation and maintenance 1.48 and 0.08, so that "the material acquisition activities (i.e., mining) account for about half of the person-days lost", totals that "cannot be directly compared to published annual rates"; material requirements for a 5-15 year build in which "mercury, argon, hydrogen, oxygen" are "a substantial portion of a one-year U.S. production rate"; and pollutant loadings that "represent measurable increments of a one-year U.S. total, indicating that the effects of SPS deployment will not be negligible", with "no systematic identification of any toxic materials involved in SPS deployment".
Evidence behind this: T3-programme summary figures from an unheld technical volume, computed for "an earlier SPS design" by the report's own note; the person-day totals are the only tabulated numbers.
Scope and limits
NO DENOMINATOR (satellites, workforce, GW) IS GIVEN FOR THE PERSON-DAYS, AND THE MATERIAL AND LOADING FIGURES ARE BAR CHARTS WITHOUT TABULATED VALUES; the report itself says the data would be updated for the later design. The Fig. 2.2 percentages are read from bars and are not stated here beyond "substantial".
What it assumes
The "earlier SPS design" behind the figures is the 1977-78 reference concept; the number of satellites the person-days cover is not stated in this volume.
Where it comes from
PDF 21 / printed 19, Fig. 2.8 (render read): million person-days lost, injuries / illness, material acquisition 14.63 / 0.45, ground construction 9.04 / 0.29, ground operation and maintenance 1.48 / 0.08, total 25.15 / 0.82; "the material acquisition activities (i.e., mining) account for about half of the person-days lost for injury and illness and that the injury rate is much higher than the illness rate" (normalised); "These rates are totals over the 30-year life of a satellite power system and cannot be directly compared to published annual rates" (normalised); "carried out for an earlier SPS design" (normalised). PDF 13 / printed 11, Fig. 2.2 (render read, bars of per cent of US annual production): "Note that the SPS requirements are system totals for a 5-15 year period, while the" US data are one year's (normalised); "Some of the materials shown (e.g., mercury, argon, hydrogen, oxygen) represent a substantial portion of a one-year U.S. production rate" (normalised). PDF 14 / printed 12: "based on an earlier SPS design configuration" (raw); "The air pollution, water use, solid waste generation, and land use requirements represent measurable increments of a one-year U.S. total, indicating that the effects of SPS deployment will not be negligible" (normalised). PDF 15 / printed 13: "To date, no systematic identification of any toxic materials involved in SPS deployment has been made" (normalised). Recomputed: 14.63 + 9.04 + 1.48 = 25.15; 0.45 + 0.29 + 0.08 = 0.82; 14.63 / 25.15 = 58 per cent; 25.15 million / 30 years / 250 days = about 3,400 worker-years lost per year, this record's arithmetic against an unstated workforce.
Basis: million person-days lost over a 30-year system life; per cent of one year's US production
Cite this
energyaperture.com/c/clm-1166
CLM-1166, Energy Aperture, as of 1978-10.
Connected records
Other published records linked to this one. A list, not a judgement.
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