Value chain · CLM-1062
In plain terms
In 1980 the launch vehicle that everything was costed on was said by its own designers to be arbitrarily big, and they proposed a rocket a third the size that would save five billion dollars up front for a three per cent higher running cost.
The claim as recorded
At the April 1980 Program Review the two system contractors recommended replacing the 420-tonne reference HLLV with a 120 to 125 tonne vehicle: "a nonrecurring savings of at least five billion dollars was obtained with a recurring cost penalty of 3% per SPS. Further, the environmental benefits of the small vehicle: reduced sonic overpressure, noise, potential blast effect in the event of an accident and less modification of the Cape Canaveral area to accommodate launch pads, were deemed more important than the slight increase in upper atmosphere propellant deposition." "As a result of these considerations, it is recommended that the small HLLV be adopted as the SPS reference launch system"; the reference vehicle's size "was somewhat arbitrary", set by a payload bay for "a fully-assembled electrical slip ring, 16 meters in diameter", with "420 gross tonnes, with an effective net payload of about 360 to 380 tonnes"; the January 1980 transportation workshop targeted "30 $ (1979)/kg" for the first satellite and "15 $(1979)/kg" for repetitive construction and judged the transportation exploratory development programme "entirely inadequate"; MBB's cost-optimised ballistic vehicle analysis gave "50 to 150 $/kg (1980)" to GEO against "Space Shuttle plus IUS (23000 $/kg)".
Evidence behind this: T3, the system contractors' abstract recommending a smaller launch vehicle, with the January 1980 workshop's cost targets and MBB's model comparison.
Scope and limits
Abstract-level: the five billion and the 3 per cent are stated, not shown; the small-HLLV per-flight price is in Boeing's Phase III report (CLM-1031), not here. Koelle's figures are a "model comparison only for concept evaluation".
What it assumes
No assumptions are recorded against this claim.
Where it comes from
PDF p.222 / printed 200, normalised: "The size of the vehicle was somewhat arbitrary. The only specific consideration was selection of a payload bay large enough to accommodate a fully-assembled electrical slip ring, 16 meters in diameter. The payload capability of the reference vehicle was estimated as 420 gross tonnes, with an effective net payload of about 360 to 380 tonnes"; "The parallel-burn configuration yields about 10% improvement in payload capability at a given liftoff mass". PDF p.223 / printed 201: "This required a square cross-section of 11 meters; the length was set at 14 meters. Paramentric investigations led to a gross lift capability requirement of 120 metric tonnes ... Mass estimating revised the parametrically-estimated lift capability to 125 tonnes"; the recommendation as quoted. PDF p.236 / printed 214, normalised: "target the average cost of gross cargo payloads into LEO at 30 $ (1979)/kg for the construction of the initial SPS, the further goal for repetitive construction of 30 to 60 SPS at 15 $(1979)/kg for all operational payloads would require the use of very advanced, long-lived vehicles"; PDF p.237 / printed 215: "The present ground based exploratory development (GBED) program in space transportation for SPS is entirely inadequate and such content as it has misses the target completely." PDF p.218 / printed 196: "A cost-optimized vehicle of this size seems to be able to realize a range of 50 to 150 $/kg (1980) specific transportation cost to GEO. This is more than two orders of magnitude lower than the Space Shuttle plus IUS (23000 $/kg). However, the range indicated means 2 to 6 Billion $ launch cost for one 5 GW SPS".
Basis: tonnes of payload; billions of dollars non-recurring; per cent recurring; $/kg (1979 and 1980 dollars as printed; the 23,000 $/kg Space Shuttle plus IUS figure has no price year)
Related records
- Answers question
- QST-003 not published in this release
Cite this
energyaperture.com/c/clm-1062
CLM-1062, Energy Aperture, as of 1980-04.
Connected records
Other published records linked to this one. A list, not a judgement.
- Also from SRC-449
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