Energy Aperture

Value chain · CLM-0746

In plain terms

A 2025 assessment by a US think tank lists which countries hold which kinds of anti-satellite capability: China and Russia hold nearly all of them, while Iran and North Korea hold jamming, spoofing, cyber attack and attacks on ground infrastructure but not missiles that can reach satellites. North Korea is also listed as able to set off a nuclear explosion in space or the upper atmosphere.

The claim as recorded

CSIS's Space Threat Assessment 2025 tabulates counterspace weapons by state as of March 2025 and records China and Russia as holding terrestrial infrastructure attack, direct-ascent anti-satellite, nuclear detonation, directed energy, jamming, spoofing and cyber operations capabilities, with orbital anti-satellite capability given as "Maybe" for China and "Probably" for Russia, while Iran and North Korea are recorded as holding terrestrial infrastructure attack, jamming, spoofing and cyber operations but no direct-ascent anti-satellite, orbital anti-satellite or directed-energy capability, with North Korea, unlike Iran, also recorded as holding nuclear detonation capability; the same page states that electronic weapons cannot destroy and only impart temporary effects for as long as the electronic system engages its target.

Scope and limits

A think-tank assessment from open sources, with a stated information date of March 2025 and no probability attached to any cell; "Maybe" and "Probably" are the source's own words and carry no defined confidence. The table records the existence of a capability class, not its performance, reach, quantity or readiness, and it says nothing about which orbits any listed capability can reach - a jammer against a LEO user terminal and one against a GEO uplink are the same table cell. The table covers four states and is not a global picture. It is the 2025 edition; no later edition is held.

What it assumes

No assumptions are recorded against this claim.

Where it comes from

SRC-224 Space Threat Assessment 2025, 54 pp., 2025
PDF p.9, Table 1, reproduced by cell: China - terrestrial infrastructure attack "Yes", direct-ascent ASAT "Yes", orbital ASAT "Maybe", nuclear detonation "Yes", directed energy "Yes", jamming "Yes", spoofing "Yes", cyber operations "Yes". Russia - as China except orbital ASAT "Probably". Iran - terrestrial infrastructure attack "Yes", direct-ascent ASAT "No", orbital ASAT "No", nuclear detonation "No", directed energy "No", jamming "Yes", spoofing "Yes", cyber operations "Yes". North Korea - terrestrial infrastructure attack "Yes", direct-ascent ASAT "No", orbital ASAT "No", nuclear detonation "Yes", directed energy "No", jamming "Yes", spoofing "Yes", cyber operations "Yes". Same page, verbatim: "These weapons cannot destroy; they only impart temporary effects for as long as the electronic system engages its target."

Basis: categorical capability assessment by state; no quantification

Related records
Answers question
QST-011 not published in this release

Cite this

energyaperture.com/c/clm-0746

CLM-0746, Energy Aperture, as of 2025-03.

Connected records

Other published records linked to this one. A list, not a judgement.

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