Value chain · CLM-1019
In plain terms
The programme gave three reasons for choosing the klystron; the company that designed the satellite said the choice was more or less arbitrary and the magnetron might be better. The 85 per cent tube efficiency that every cost chain uses is the contractor's estimate.
The claim as recorded
The programme office states that "the klystron was selected over the amplitron because of higher gain, lower noise, and higher output per tube" and that the magnetron "appears promising but has not been examined as thoroughly"; Boeing, in the reference system description the office consolidates, states that "the selection of the klystron as the baseline RF amplifier was somewhat arbitrary", rates its efficiency as "good efficiency (85% estimated)" and the magnetron as "probably slightly better efficiency" with "tests needed to discriminate".
Evidence behind this: T3, the programme office and its prime contractor at odds on whether the tube choice had a basis.
Scope and limits
Both are 1979-1981 positions; the magnetron programme that followed (SRC-559, SRC-560) and the noise dispute of CLM-1004 are not assessed here.
What it assumes
No assumptions are recorded against this claim.
Where it comes from
PDF p.42, normalised with faults: "the klystron was selected over the am~li tron because of higher gain, lower noise, and hiaher output per tube. The magnetron appears promising but has not been examined as thoroughly as the kly1tron and the amplitron." SRC-495 PDF p.73, raw: "The selection of the klystron as the baseline RF amplifier was somewhat arbitrary"; "Good efficiency (85% estimated)"; "Probably slightly better efficiency"; "tests needed to discriminate".
Basis: stated reasons; per cent efficiency, estimated
Related records
- Answers question
- QST-002 not published in this releaseQST-017 not published in this release
Cite this
energyaperture.com/c/clm-1019
CLM-1019, Energy Aperture, as of 1981.
Connected records
Other published records linked to this one. A list, not a judgement.
- Also from SRC-495
- CLM-0996The beams the reference satellite would be built from are specified down to the wall thickness, and two contractors give the stiffness...CLM-1018Three years of study left the efficiency chain exactly where 1978 put it, and Boeing's own version says out loud the solar constant the...CLM-1021Boeing ran the timing reference down glass fibre in four stages, measured each fibre's delay by sending the signal back, and used a second...
- Also from SRC-554
- CLM-0911If the steering signal from the ground stops, the 1978 design's beam does not carry on pointing somewhere. It falls apart, and the power on...CLM-1017By 1981 the programme itself said the ionospheric limit it had designed to was probably too cautious, and worked out what relaxing it to...CLM-1018Three years of study left the efficiency chain exactly where 1978 put it, and Boeing's own version says out loud the solar constant the...CLM-1020By 1981 the programme was confident the beam could be pointed and formed, and named the network that carries the timing reference across...CLM-1022A loss you can make up by adding solar panels costs about 56 million dollars per percentage point; a loss at the ionospheric ceiling costs...CLM-1087When the programme wrote down why it used 2.45 GHz, its reasons were consistent: each time it named the industrial band and how the beam...CLM-1091The people running the programme said 2.45 GHz was sensible and also said, in the same breath, that nobody international had agreed to it...CLM-1478Almost everything that can go wrong with this design makes the beam fall apart and become harmless, which is the right way to fail. Two...