Energy Aperture

Value chain · CLM-0762

In plain terms

The civil space command-link security standard says exactly which parts of a message it protects and which it does not: it fully protects the command payload, only partly protects the message header, and leaves several control and status channels unprotected altogether.

The claim as recorded

The CCSDS Space Data Link Security Protocol states its own coverage boundaries service by service: for Telecommand it provides authentication, encryption and authenticated encryption for the data in the Transfer Frame Data Field and therefore full protection for the MAP Packet, MAP Access, Virtual Channel Packet and Virtual Channel Access services, provides authentication but not encryption for some Transfer Frame Primary Header fields, and provides no protection for the control frames generated for the Communications Operation Procedure Management Service nor for frames supplied by external sources on the Virtual Channel Frame and Master Channel Frame services; for Telemetry it additionally provides no protection for the Virtual Channel Operational Control Field, Master Channel Frame Secondary Header and Master Channel Operational Control Field services, and for Advanced Orbiting Systems none for the Virtual Channel Operational Control Field and Insert services.

Scope and limits

A statement of what a standard specifies, not of what any system implements, and not evidence that any mission's links are or are not protected. The uncovered service lists differ by protocol and must not be merged: the VC_OCF, MC_FSH and MC_OCF gap is the TELEMETRY case, while the telecommand gap is the COP Management Service plus externally supplied VCF and MCF frames. The register row for SRC-232 gives the three telemetry services as the coverage gap and that is correct for telemetry only. This claim says nothing about the practical exploitability of any gap. Note also that SRC-232 is registered at tier T1, which METHOD 3.1 defines as a measured experimental result in a peer-reviewed venue; the tier is used as registered and the question is raised in section 5, not resolved here.

What it assumes

No assumptions are recorded against this claim.

Where it comes from

SRC-232 CCSDS 355.0-B-2, Space Data Link Security Protocol, Blue Book, Recommended Standard, July 2022,...
Telecommand coverage, SRC-232 PDF p.18, verbatim: "The Security Protocol provides all its functions (authentication, encryption, and authenticated encryption) for the data in the Transfer Frame Data Field of a TC Transfer Frame. It therefore provides full protection for the service data of the following TC Services: the Multiplexer Access Point (MAP) Packet (MAPP) Service, the MAP Access (MAPA) Service, the Virtual Channel Packet (VCP) Service, and the Virtual Channel Access (VCA) Service." Telecommand gaps, same page, verbatim: "The Security Protocol provides authentication for some fields in the Transfer Frame Primary Header in a TC Transfer Frame. It does not provide encryption for these fields." Same page, verbatim: "There are no auxiliary data fields in a TC Transfer Frame. The Security Protocol provides no protection for the control frames generated for the Communications Operation Procedure (COP) Management Service (see references [D11] and [D10]). The Security Protocol also provides no protection for the frames supplied to the TC Protocol by external sources on the following services: the VCF Service and the MCF Service." Telemetry gaps, SRC-232 PDF p.17, verbatim: "The Security Protocol provides no protection for data of the other TM Services that use auxiliary data fields in a TM Transfer Frame: the Virtual Channel Operational Control Field (VC_OCF) Service, the Master Channel Frame Secondary Header (MC_FSH) Service, and the Master Channel Operational Control Field (MC_OCF) Service." AOS gaps, SRC-232 PDF p.18, verbatim: "The Security Protocol provides no protection for data of the AOS Services that use auxiliary data fields in an AOS Transfer Frame: the VC_OCF Service and the Insert Service."

Basis: protocol service coverage, by named CCSDS service

Related records
Answers question
QST-011 not published in this release

Cite this

energyaperture.com/c/clm-0762

CLM-0762, Energy Aperture, as of 2022-07.

Connected records

Other published records linked to this one. A list, not a judgement.

Also from SRC-232
CLM-0763The civil space link security standards deliberately do not say which encryption to use, do not describe how to build a real system, and...